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Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment Challenges
the Common Law Action of Criminal
Conversation: Kline u. Ansell
At common law the cause of action for criminal conversation' was maintainable solely by the husband.' The basis of the
action was adultery," and a plaintiff-husband could recover upon
proving that a valid marriage existed and that his wife and the
defendant-interloper engaged in sexual intercourse.' Although
the right to maintain a criminal conversation action belonged
exclusively to the husband at common law,' virtually all American jurisdictions recognizing the action6 now permit the wife to
1. " 'Criminal' because it was an ecclesiastical crime; 'conversation' in the sense of
intercourse." W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS
875 n.75 (4th ed. 1971). For
a more detailed history of criminal conversation, see Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 651, 654-60 (1930).
COMMENTARIES
*532. Blackstone states:
2. 2 W. BLACKSTONE,
Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it &.as a public
crime, left by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts, yet, considered as
a civil injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction
to the husband for it by action of trespass ui et armis against the adulterer,
wherein the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary.
Id. See also 2 T. COOLEY,
LAWOF TORTSfj 167 (4th ed. 1932).
3. W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 875.
"In its general and comprehensive sense, the term criminal conversation is synonymous with adultery; but in its more limited and technical signification, in which it is here
to be considered, it may be defined as adultery in the aspect of a tort." Turner v.
Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 67, 206 S.W. 23, 23 (1918).
4. Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 209, 170 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1969); Trainor v.
Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 136, 259 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1969); Schneider v. Mistele, 39
Wis. 2d 137, 141, 158 N.W.2d 383, 384 (1968). See Note, Piracy on the Matrimonial
Seas-The Law and the Marital Interloper, 25 Sw. L.J. 594, 598 (1971).
5. The primary reason that only the husband could bring a criminal conversation
action is that the husband was considered to have a property right in the body of his
wife. Since the wife was regarded as a chattel, a trespass action would lie against an
interloper who had, in essence, used another's property. Lippman, supra note 1, at 65556. The obstacles to a wife's recovery for her husband's adultery were first procedural
because at common law she generally could not sue without joining her husband. Furthermore, whatever she might recover would become his property. See Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y.584, 593, 23 N.E. 17, 19-20 (1889).
6. Although most states still recognize the cause of action for criminal conversation,
currently sixteen states and the District of Columbia have legislatively abolished it. See
ALA.CODEfj 6-5-331 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODEfj 43.5 (West 1954); COLO.REV.STAT.fj 1320-202 (1973); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. fj 52-572f (West Supp. 1980); DEL.CODEANN. tit.
fj 16-923 (West Supp. 1978); FLA.STAT.ANN. fj
lo, fj 3924 (1974); D.C. CODEENCYCL.
771.01 (West 1964); GA. CODEANN. fj 105-1203 (Supp. 1980); IND. CODEANN. fj 34-4-4-1
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maintain it, either by statute or by reason of a liberal interpretation of the married women's property acts.' The Maryland Court
of Appeals, however, took a different approach in Kline v. Ansell.8 Rather than expanding the cause of action for criminal
conversation to allow the wife to maintain it against her husband's paramour, the court held the action unconstitutional as
being violative of the state equal rights amendment and abolished it in its entirety?
On August 17, 1962, Mr. Donald S. Ansell married Vivian
The Ansell's marriage
Jean Klapperd in Biloxi, Missi~sippi.~~
was marred by frequent arguments, financial difficulties, physical violence, and Mr. Ansell's alcohol problem.ll On November
10, 1977, Mrs. Ansell and their three children left the marital
residence at the suggestion of her husband." In early 1978,
Floyd R. Kline began having sexual relations with Mrs. Ansell
even though she was still lawfully married to Mr. Ansell.lS Mr.
Ansell filed a complaint against Mr. Nine in Maryland's Washington County Circuit Court on September 1, 1978, seeking
(Burns Supp. 1980); MICH.COW. LAWSANN. g 600.2901 (1968); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §
553.02 (West Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT.ANN. 8 2A:23-1 (West 1952); N.Y.CIV.RIGHTSLAW
§ 80-a (McKinney 1976); OR. REV. STAT. 30.850 (1979); VA. CODE§ 8.01-220 (1950);
WIS. STAT.ANN. 768.01 (West Supp. 1980); WYO.STAT. 1-23-101 (1977). Prior to the
Maryland Court of Appeals' decision in Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929 (Md. 1980), there
were only two states that had judicially abolished criminal conversation. Bearbower v.
Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147
(1976).
7. W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 881-82.
8. 414 A.2d 929 (Md. 1980). Maryland's Married Women's Act provides in pertinent
sue
. for torts committed
part as follows: "Married women shall have power to
against them, as fully as if they were unmarried:" MD. ANN. CODEart. 45, § 5 (Supp.
1979). The Kline court explained that Maryland's Married Women's Act was not intended to create rights for married women in addition to those enjoyed by single women
at common law. Since single women obviously could not maintain a criminal conversation action at common law, the Married Women's Act did not extend that right to married women. 414 A.2d a t 933 n.4.
9. 414 A.2d at 933.
10. Brief for Appellant at 2. Although the couple was married in Mississippi, they
resided in New Jersey where three children were born to them. In 1971 they moved to
Hagerstown, Maryland. Id.
11. Id. at 3. After moving hia family to Hagerstown, Mr. Anaell returned to New
Jersey where he began serving an 18 month prison sentence for an earlier criminal conviction. During Mr. Ansell's absence, Mrs. Ansell was forced to rely primarily on public
assistance for financial support. Id. a t 2.
12. Id. a t 3.
13. Id. Mr. Kline first met Mrs. Ansell in 1976. Later, after she had left her husband, Mr. a line helped Mrs. Ansell purchase a residence for her and her three children.
At the time of the appeal Mr. Kline lived with Mrs. Ansell. Id.

. .. ..
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damages for criminal conversation and assault."
The jury found in favor of Mr. Ansell on the criminal conversation count and the court awarded $40,000 compensatory
damages and $4,250 punitive damages.'' Maryland's court of
final jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, reversed?
The court, in a unanimous opinion, began with an extensive
history of the action for criminal conversation.17 Although the
court set forth most of the rationales that have been relied upon
by courts and legislatures to justify abolishing criminal conversation, it chose not to rest its decision on any of them.'. Instead
the court reasoned that because the action for criminal conversation in its common law form provided different benefits for and
imposed different burdens upon men vis-a-vis women, it could
not be reconciled with the Maryland equal rights amendment.'@
The court relied heavily on Rand v. Rand:O one of its own decisions dealing with the impact of Maryland's equal rights amendment on the father's common law obligation to support his minor children. The Rand court held that the equal rights
amendment mandated that the common law obligation of child
support be shared equally by both parents.21 The Kline court
determined that applying the Rand rationale produced a clear
result: the elimination of the criminal conversation cause of action in Maryland.PP
The rationale that state equal rights provisions mandate the
abolition of criminal conversation is unsound in terms of legal
analysis. The Kline decision represents a dangerous and unprecedented application of a state equal rights amendment in the
area of family law. Rather than abolishing criminal conversation
altogether, the court should have modified the rules governing
-

-

14. 414 A.2d at 929-30.
15. Brief for Appellant at 1.
16. 414 Ad at 933. Following the trial court's directed verdict against Mr. Kline, he
filed an appeal in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland as well as a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The writ of certiorari was granted
by the highest court before consideration by the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 930.
17. Id. at 930-31.
18. Id. at 932. In response to these rationales, the court stated: "Were the interrelated judicial and legislative history of this action in Maryland the only factor to be
considered, we would deem it inappropriate to predicate its demise on the ground that it
is unreasonable and anachronistic." Id.
19. Id. at 933.
20. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
21. Id. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905.
22. 414 A.2d at 933.
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the action to ensure its just operation.
Equal rights provisions do not mandate the elimination of
the cause of action for criminal conversation. The wording of
Maryland's equal rights amendment is clear and unambiguous:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex."'Vhe thrust of the state equal rights provision "is to insure equality of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for distin~tion.''~~
The elimination of sex
discrimination does not require the elimination of rights for
both men and women. The more logical consequence of state
equal rights amendments and state constitutions containing
equal rights provisions is to extend to women those rights that
were previously enjoyed only by men.
The Kline court is the first court to rely on an equal rights
amendment to abolish the criminal conversation cause of action? Surprisingly, neither the appellee's nor the appellant's
brief even mentioned Maryland's equal rights amendment?
Furthermore, the facts of the case do not readily present an
equal rights issue because a woman was not seeking to bring the
action. Since no precedent existed, and since neither brief discussed Maryland's equal rights amendment, it is clear that the
court generated its own equal rights argument.
In search of some supporting authority for its decision, the
court turned to its own analysis in Rand v. Rand.'' The Rand
decision, however, does not support the Kline court's abolition
of the criminal conversation cause of action. In Rand the court
extended to women the father's common law obligation to sup23. MD. CONST.Declaration of Rights art. 46.
24. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d at 932 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97,
101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974)). See also Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508,374 A.2d 900 (1977);
Eckstein v. Eckstein, 38 Md. App. 506,379 A.2d 757 (1978); Bell v. Bell, 38 Md. App. 10,
379 A.2d 419 (1977); Coleman v. State, 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977).
25. Only Pennsylvania and Iowa had judicially abolished criminal conversation prior
to Kline. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania justified abolishing criminal conversation
on the ground that it "impose[s] upon a defendant such harsh results without affording
any real opportunity to interject logically valid defenses . . . such as the role of the
plaintWs spouse in the adulterous relationship or the quality of the plaintifF's marriage
. . . ." Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 281, 365 A.2d 147, 151 (1976). The Supreme
Court of Iowa relied upon essentially the same rationale to abolish criminial conversation
in Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 1978). Although neither court relied
on an equal rights provision to abolish criminal conversation, Pennsylvania could have
because it has an equal rights amendment.
26. See Brief for Appellant and Brief for Appellee, Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d 929
(Md. 1980).
27. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
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port his minor children, holding that "the parental obligation for
child support . . . is one shared by both parents."28 The equal
rights amendment in that instance expanded, not contracted,
the common-law child support obligation. A correct application
of Rand to the instant case merely would have extended to women the right to maintain a criminal conversation action, not
eliminated that right for both men and women. This misapplication of both the Maryland equal rights amendment and the
Rand rationale to the criminal conversation cause of action is a
major flaw in the court's analysis.
Numerous other examples exist where courts have applied
to laws governing family matstate equal rights amendmentsa@
t e r ~ In
. ~such
~ situations the courts have extended to men and
women those family rights previously denied them, rather than
eliminated essential rights to which they were entitled. An examination of the impact that state equal rights provisions have
had on child custody, child support, and consortium rights will
demonstrate the anomaly the Kline decision represents.
Rand is not the only case in which a court has extended to
women the common law obligation of child support under the
authority of a state equal rights amendment. Other courts also
have held that child support should be shared equally by both
parents.a1 This is not to say that both parents must give equal
contributions, rather each parent has an equal obligation to provide child support in accordance with his or her ability." No
case authority exists for the situation where an equal rights
amendment or an equivalent constitutional provision has eliminated the parental obligation of child support.
Equal rights legislation has initiated a similar expansion of
traditional family law rights in the child custody area. The pre28. Id. at 516, 374 A2d at 905.
29. Presently sixteen s t a h have equal rights amendments or equal rights provisions
in their constitutions. See ALASKACONST. art. 1, 3; COLO.CONST.art. 2, 5 29; CONN.
CONST.art. 1, 20; HAWAII
CONST.art. 1 , s 4; ILL. CONST.art. 1, 5 18; MD. CONST.DeclaCONST.pt. I, art. 1; MONT.CONST.art. 2, § 4; N.H. CONST.
ration of Rights art. 46; MASS.
pt. I, art. 2; N.M.CONST.art. 2, 5 18; PA. CONST.art. 1, § 28, TEX.
CONST.art. 1, 5 3a;
UTAHCONST.art. 4 , s 1; VA.CONST.art. 1 , s 11; WASH.CONST.art. 31, § 1; WYO.CONST.
art. 1, 5 3.
30. See Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 158, 178-203 (1979).
31. See Conway v. Dana, 456 P a 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974); Lyle v. Lyle, 248 Pa.
Super. Ct. 458, 375 A.2d 187 (1977); Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975); Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
32. See Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Cooper v.
Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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sumption that the mother is a more suitable custodian of the
children than the father, and therefore should be given custody
of the children on divorce, has been held to violate state equal
rights provisions." The wife's right to custody of the children
was not eliminated, but the husband was placed on equal status
with her.
The right to sue for loss of consortium represents another
area of family law where state equal rights legislation has had an
impact. In Hopkins v. B l a n ~ o ,the
~ Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that under the state's equal rights amendment, the
wife possesses the same right that the husband does to sue for
loss of consortium. Other courts have reached similar r e s ~ l & . ~ ~
In the consortium context as in others, the application of equal
rights legislation enabled women to bring an action that they
previously could not maintain.
The very application of equal rights provisions to criminal
conversation is somewhat superficial in that married women in
virtually all jurisdictions recognizing the action are now able to
maintain it? American courts had already extended women the
right to bring a criminal conversation action long before states
began enacting equal rights legislation. The New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Oppenheim v. Kridels7 recognized over fifty
. years ago that there was no valid reason why women should be
denied the right to bring a criminal conversation action:
33. See, e.g., Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill. App. 3d 401,320 N.E.2d 581 (1974); Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill. App. 3d 479, 317 N.E.2d 681 (1974); Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290,368 A.2d 635 (1977); McGowan v. McGowan, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 41,374
A.2d 1306 (1977). See also Strand v. Strand, 41 Ill. App. 3d 651, 355 N.E.2d 47 (1976);
Davis v. Davis, 41 Ill. App. 3d 942,354 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Christensen v. Christensen, 31
Ill. App. 3d 1041, 335 N.E.2d 581 (1975); Pratt v. Pratt, 30 Ill. App. 3d 214, 330 N.E.2d
244 (1975); Kauffman v. Kauffman, 30 Ill. App. 3d 159, 333 N.E.2d 695 (1975).
34. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
35. See Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974); Miller v. Whittlesey, 562
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
supra note 1, at 881-82. See, e.g., Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65,
36. W. PROSSER,
206 S.W. 23 (1918); N o h v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283,77 N.E. 890 (1906); White v. Longo,
190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973); Seaver v. Adams, 66 N.H. 142, 19 A. 776 (1890);
Knighton v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947); Scates v. Nailling, 196 Tenn.
508,268 S.W.2d 561 (1954); Cahoon v. Peltoa, 9 Utah 2d 224,342 P.2d 94 (1959); Frederick v. Morse, 88 Vt. 126,92 A. 16 (1914). Also, many of the jurisdictions that have abolished the criminal conversation cause of action had previously permitted women to
maintain it. See, e.g., Parker v. Newman, 200 Ah. 103, 75 So. 479 (1917); Foot v. Card,
58 Conn. 1, 18 A. 1027 (1889); Krom v. Krom, 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d 247 (1976);
Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156,140 N.E. 227 (1923); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13,
156 A.2d 537 (1959).
37. 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
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[Tlhere is no sound and legitimate reason for denying a cause
of action for criminal conversation to the wife while giving it to
the husband. Surely she is as much interested as the husband
in maintaining the home and wholesome, clean, and affectionate relatonships. Her feelings must be as sensitive as his toward the intruder, and it would be mere willful blindness on
the part of the courts to ignore these facts. Both the courts of
this state and the statutes have recognized this change in the
status, rights, and privileges of a married woman.J8

For many years most courts have allowed women to bring a
criminal conversation action by simply expanding the commonlaw rule. Therefore, there is no compelling reason to apply equal
rights legislation to the cause of action for criminal conversation.
The Kline court's inconsistency in application of Maryland's equal rights amendment to criminal conversation is further demonstrated by Geelhoed v. JensenYmone of its own decisions that had earlier recognized by way of dictum a married
woman's right to maintain a criminal conversation action. After
referring to the husband's right to bring a criminal conversation
action, the Geelhoed court cited Restatement of Torts 5 690
(1938), which allows a wife to bring a criminal conversation action.'O The Kline court distinguished the Geelhoed decision by
we did not consider the imcontending that "[iln Geelhoed,
pact of the ERA."41 In addition to summarily distinguishing
Geelhoed, the Kline court failed to mention Krom v. Krom," a
Maryland lower court decision holding that "the tort of criminal
conversation may be maintained by the wife of a marriage. Such,
~ ~ Kline court, however,
plainly, is the weight of a u t h ~ r i t y . "The
refused to follow "the weight of authority"44 and effectively
overruled Krom and the Geelhoed dicta.
The application of Maryland's equal rights amendment to
criminal conversation was also unwarranted in light of Maryland's legislative action regarding the tort. As recently as 1977,

...

38. Id. at 162, 140 N.E. at 229.
39. 277 Md. 220, 352 A.2d 818 (1976).
40. Id. at 225, 352 A.2d at 821.
41. 414 A.2d at 932.
42. 31 Md. App. 635, 358 A.2d 247 (1976).
43. Id. at 637, 358 A.2d at 249. The Krom court justified its holding by relying on
Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138, 48 A.2d 132 (1900), a Maryland Court of Appeals' decision
that recognized a wife's right to maintain an action for alienation of affections.
44. Krom v. Krom, 31 Md. App. at 637,358 A.2d at 249. See generally 41 AM. JUR.
2d Husband and Wife 8 476 (1958); 42 C.J.S. Husband and Wife8 698 (1972).
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both houses of Maryland's legislature rejected House Bill 170,
which would have abolished criminal conversation? Contrary to
this clear signal from the legislature that the cause of action be
retained, the Kline court used the equal rights rationale to abolish criminal conversation.
It is apparent, therefore, that the court's reliance on the
equal rights amendment as a justification for abolishing criminal
conversation is misplaced. A proper application of the Maryland
equal rights amendment to criminal conversation would have extended to women the right to maintain the action. The Kline
court's use of the equal rights amendment to eliminate a family
law right is a clear break from other case authority where equal
rights provisions have been applied to family law. Also, the very
application of Maryland's equal rights amendment to criminal
conversation was unnecessary because married women already
enjoyed the right to maintain the action in Maryland by reason
of Krom and the Geelhoed dicta. Furthermore, Maryland's legislature clearly indicated its public policy choice to retain an action for criminal conversation. Thus, the Kline court's use of the
Maryland equal rights amendment to abolish criminal conversation suggests that an equal rights provision can be used by the
courts as a sword to eliminate essential family law rights.
Desite the unusual and questionable approach taken by the
Maryland Court of Appeals in abolishing criminal conversation,
the cause of action itself hae nevertheless been in disrepute for
over half a century. At common law a plaintiff needed to prove
only two facts to recover: (1) a valid marriage existed with his or
her spouse, and (2) an act of sexual intercourse occurred between his or her spouse and the defendant. This "strict liability"
tort first came under attack in the United States with the AntiHeart Balm legislation of the 1 9 3 0 P Many rationales have been
offered to justify its demise:
The action for criminal conversation is notorious for affording
a fertile field for blackmail and extortion because it involves an
accusation of sexual misbehavior. Criminal conversation actions may frequently be brought, not for the purpose of preserving the marital relationship, but rather for purely merce45. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d at 932.
46. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balmn, 33 MICH.L. REV.979 (1935);
Kane, Heart Balm and Public Policy 5 FORDHAM
L. REV.63 (1936); Kingsley, The "AntiHeart Balm" Statute, The Work of the 1939 California Legislature, 13 So. CAL.L. REV.
37 (1939).
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nary or vindictive motives. An award of damages does not
constitute an effective deterrent to the act of adultery, and it
does not effectively help to preserve or restore a marital relationship in which adultery has already occurred. Indeed, a contested trial may destroy a chance to restore a meaningful relationship. In addition, this action, which eliminates all defenses
except the husband's consent and which imposes liability without any regard to the quality of the marital relationship, is incompatible with today's sense of fairness. Most important, today's sense of the increasing personal and sexual freedom of
women is incompatible with the rationale underlying this
action.'?

Although some of the attacks that have been made against
the tort of criminal conversation are valid, many of them are
unpersuasive. The argument that criminal conversation is not an
effective deterrent to the act of adultery confuses tort law with
criminal law. An underlying rationale of all tort liability "is the
concern with compensation for harm done."48 If a harm has occurred to a recognized interest, in this case the interest in one's
marriage, then tort law should apply to compensate for the harm
suffered. Possible deterrence is only secondary. Although tort
law may deter wrongful conduct, the main responsibility for deterring wrongful conduct rests in the body of criminal law.'@
Since the primary function of tort law is to compensate for
harm suffered, the inability of the defendant to assert as a defense the fact that the plaintiff's spouse consented to the adulterous relation is also justified. Mrs. Ansell's consent to sexual
relations with Mr. Kline does not alleviate the harm possibly
suffered by Mr. Ansell, nor should it negate the compensation to
which Mr. Ansell may be entitled."
The argument that today's increasing personal and sexual
freedom justifies abolishing criminal conversation is also unpersuasive. Tort liability is imposed upon a person who has harmed
another by engaging in "conduct which is socially unreasonable."" Most married people still consider it socially unreasonable for a third person to have sexual relations with his or her
47. Kline v. Ansell, 414 A.2d at 931.
48. P. KEETON
& R. KEETON,
CASESAND MATERULSON TORTS2 (2d ed. 1977).
49. Id. at 1-2.
50. See generally Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
supra note 1, at 6. See Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 285, 365
51. W. PROSSER,
A.2d 147, 154 (1976) (Roberts,J., dissenting).
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However, not all of the arguments favoring the abolition of
criminal conversation are unpersuasive. Some valid criticisms of
common-law criminal conversation actions are that the defendant is not permitted to assert logically valid defensesss and that
the action may be brought for purely mercenary or vindictive
motives. Of these criticisms, the classical attack on criminal conversation is its susceptibility to abuse. I t is widely recognized
that a criminal conversation action may be brought for purely
mercenary or vindictive motives. Many actions are susceptible to
abuse, yet that does not necessarily justify abolishing them?
One helpful modification that might alleviate abuse of the action
would be to permit the factfinder to consider whether the action
is a sham and, in such instances, to reduce damages accordingly.
If the case were being tried to a jury, the court could instruct
the jury that the plaintiffs motive in bringing the cause of action is a factor to consider in determining the damages award.
This would discourage opportunists from bringing criminal conversation actions and thereby would lessen the potential for
abuse. Had the jury in the Kline case been able to consider Mr.
Ansell's motive in bringing the cause of action, it is questionable
whether $40,000 in compensatory damages would have been
awarded.
Another persuasive attack on criminal conversation is that
the only defense available to the defendant is the plaintiffs consent. The inability of the defendant to assert logically valid de52. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. at 285, 365 A.2d at 154.
53. The only valid defense to criminal conversation was the husband's consent to
the adulterous relation. See, e.g., Kohlhoss v. Mobley, 102 Md. 199, 62 A. 236 (1905).
The Kline court stated:
The fact that the wife consented, that she was the aggressor, that she represented herself as single, that she was mistreated or neglected by her husband,
that she and her husband were separated through no fault of her own, or that
her huaband was impotent, were not valid defenses.
414 A.2d at 930. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,THE LAWOF TORTS612-14
(1956); W. PROSSER,
supra note 1, at 875; RESTA~MENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS$ 687 (1977).
54. See Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1942).
First, the very purpose of courts is to separate the just from the unjust causes;
secondly, if the courts are to be closed against actions for . . . alienation of
affections on the ground that some suits may be brought in bad faith, the same
reason would close the door against litigants in all kinds of suits, for in every
kind of litigation some suits are brought in bad faith; the very purpose of
courts is to defeat unjust prosecutions and to secure the rights of parties in
just prosecutions.
Id. at 729.
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fenses may produce harsh results. This rule could be modified so
that the defendant would not be liable unless he knew or should
have known that his paramour was married. Such a modification
would permit the defendant to assert his ignorance of any marital relationship as a defense. Since the basis of criminal conversation is intermeddling with the marital relationship, a person
should not be liable for the harm he causes unless he knows or
by reasonable inquiry should have known that he is interfering
with a marriage.""
Another prudent modification would be to permit the
factfinder to consider the quality of the marital relationship in
determining the amount of recoverable damages." The key criterion in such a determination should be whether the husband
and wife are still living together in a marital relationship. The
facts in the Kline case illustrate the need for this change. Since
Mr. Ansell suggested that Mrs. Ansell leave the marital residence," and since the Ansells were separated when Mrs. Ansell
began having intercourse with Mr. Kline:8 it is highly questionable whether Mr. Ansell suffered any compensable harm. The
trial court's $44,250 award probably would have been substantially less if the quality of the marital relationship had been considered as a factor in determining the actual harm suffered by
Mr. Ansell.
The primary interest the tort of criminal conversation seeks
to protect is a highly valued interest in most marriages: the exclusive right to have sexual intercourse with one's spouse." The
cause of action for criminal conversation seeks to preserve one of
the most delicate human relationships-that of husband and
55. Note, The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska, 58 NEB.L. REV. 595,
607-08 (1979).
56. Arguably, the mere occurrence of infidelity in a marriage indicates deterioration
in the quality of that marital relationship. There are, however, instances where the interloper intrudes into a normally secure marriage by way of seduction and thereby destroys
a quality marital relationship. In any event, allowing the quality of the marriage to be a
factor would just allow the jury to make a case-by-case judgment of what harm, if any,
has been done.
57. Brief for Appellant at 3.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 66 N.W.2d 420 (1954); Hargraves v.
Ballou, 47 R.I. 186, 131A. 643 (1926); McMillian v. Felsenthal, 482 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1972).
Although the interest sought to be protected is quite narrow, the real basis of recovery is
"the defilement of the marriage bed, the blow to the family honor, and the suspicion cast
supra note 1, at 875.
upon the legitimacy of the offspring." W. PROSSER,
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wife.60 Although the Ansell marriage had deteriorated to the
point that perhaps no relationship remained, many other viable
marital relationships exist that deserve protection. Rather than
abolishing the cause of action for criminal conversation by using
a questionable equal rights amendment rationale, the Maryland
Court of Appeals should have considered the modifications of
criminal conversation presented here. By retaining the action for
criminal conversation in a modified form, a civil remedy would
still be available to those who actually had been harmed by an
unwarranted interference with their marriage while avoiding
many of the injustices the action may produce?
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60. See 1 F. HARPER
& F. J-S,
supra note 53 at 606.
61. Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 479, 268 N.W.2d 582, 588 (1978) (McCown, J.,
dissenting).

